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Watching 
More Than 
“The Cow” 
in Tehran
Bridget Joyce
The essay, “Watching More than The Cow in 
Tehran,”explores how, over time, Iranians 
have used cinema to define a national cultural 
identity. The title of this essay is an allusion to 
Fatema Keshavarz’s book Jasmine and Stars: 
Reading More than Lolita in Tehran, which 
explores misconceptions of Iranian society 
in the Western world perpetuated by the 
past Orientalist and present New Orientalist 
narratives. Although Iranian filmmakers were 
often constrained by their government, 
first in a monarchy and later in a theocracy, 
their creativity and ability to convey the 
emotions of a nation were not stifled. 
By examining the progression of the Iranian 
film industry, with special attention to its 
political and historical context, one can 
discern not only the ideological intentions of 
ruling regimes, but also the progression of how 
Iranain identity is interpreted domestically 
and the image ordinary Iranians would like 
to convey to the outside world.
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In the past century the culture of Iran 
has, like all nations around the globe, 
transformed. Ideologies, perspectives and 
voices are far different now than they were 
a century ago. The path of the nation’s film 
industry through its rise, fall and incredible 
resurgence is evidence of such change. It 
was through the production of film as an 
art and the debate surrounding its content 
that Iranians came to create and embrace 
their cultural identity. In one interview, 
Iranian director Mohsen Makhmalbaf 
drew attention to how this particular art 
in its Iranian form is unique; shaped both 
by contemporary context and historical 
foundations. Political constraints may have 
guided the direction of the film industry, 
but cultural uniqueness gave Iranian 
film the necessary kick to succeed on the 
world stage. Unlike cultures historically 
preoccupied with images, “Iran,” he says, 
“is a land of poets. Our images come from 
our poetry. We could even say that the tree 
of Iranian cinema found it roots in Persian 
poetry.”1 Film was, and continues to be, 
used as a medium to convey to the 
audiences domestically and also abroad 
the vitality of Iranian culture and its status 
as a society that can overcome perceived 
political barriers.   
Historically, Iranian cinema has been 
less stifled by its censorship than may be 
perceived. Iranian cinema was more often 
used as a tool of the governing regime to 
promote a particular ideological framework. 
According to Azadeh Farahmand, 
“Censorship in Iran has existed in one form 
or another as early as the 1920s, having 
survived both monarchy and theocracy.”2 
Before one can begin to understand how 
censorship has shaped Iranian cinema, it is 
important to identify the different methods 
and goals of censorship each regime sought. 
The initial aim of censorship in the 1920s 
was on film exhibition and relied on theatre 
owners yielding to pressure from religious 
groups concerned about exposure to the 
West’s loose sense of morals. This informal 
method of censorship continued until the 
1950s when committees were organized 
at the local level that were responsible for 
reviewing and supervising both imported 
and locally produced films before they 
could be shown to the public. Their stated 
goal was to avoid specific themes declared 
detrimental or morally wrong to the Islam 
and Shi’ism, such as in the inappropriate 
seduction of women and girls.3 
By 1968 the federal government 
established the Ministry of Culture and 
the Arts, which it tasked with establishing 
more universal censorship requirements. 
The breadth of forbidden themes expanded 
with the creation of the Ministry as it 
began to not allow any subject critical to 
the monarchy. Throughout the 1970s, in an 
effort to establish a sense of government 
pride and national prosperity, the Ministry 
outlawed any films that depicted poverty 
or anguish.4 
The revolution did, of course, bring some 
change to the government’s attitude towards 
cinematic material. For instance, films that 
depicted poverty, anguish or rebellion were 
allowed back into the mainstream and even 
sometimes celebrated.  Yet, the refrain of 
censorship remained strikingly similar in 
maintaining repression of themes such as 
political criticism and social dissent. This 
link between the policies of the two regimes 
indicates that both realized the power and 
potential of cinema in Iranian society.
In the early 1980s censorship practices 
advanced to control films prior to 
production. Before even screenplays 
obtained permission to start production, it 
was necessary that the synopsis of the film 
be approved by the Council of Screenplay 
Film was, and continues to be, 
used as a medium to convey 
to the audiences 
domestically and also abroad 
the vitality of Iranian culture 
and its status as a society 
that can overcome 
perceived political barriers.
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to accomplish their goals of cultivating 
Iranian cinema in post-revolution Iran. 
He noted that the government’s programs 
focused on filmmakers rather than film. 
Again, this shift in paradigm supported 
their revelations in how to ensure the right 
films were produced. They were able to do 
so while still avoiding the repressive act of 
banning films. The government launched a 
new training program with the intention of 
creating a new system of leadership in the 
film industry. Remnants of filmmakers from 
the Shah’s era, they felt, would be better off 
outside of Iran. Essentially, the government 
had undertaken a mission of state training 
of filmmakers. According to cinema critic 
Akbar Nabavi, the government outlined 
a three-pronged approach it would use to 
create high-grade cinema: direct, protect and 
check. Thus, authorities could play the role 
of guides towards acceptable films rather 
than have direct control.7
The most significant development in the 
post-revolution censorship timeline came in 
April 1989 when the government took a step 
back and allowed films that had previously 
been banned to be screened. Observers 
most commonly attribute this movement 
towards liberalization to one of two possible 
explanations. The first is that the regime 
had become confident that less supervision 
was necessary because it had succeeded in 
ingraining Islamic values in this art form. 
Another explanation provided was that 
criticism of the hegemony of authorities 
forced them into taking a softer stance in 
hopes of boosting the morale of filmmakers.8 
These liberalization measures did not 
last very long. By 1993 it was once again 
mandatory that scripts be pre-approved 
before production of a film could take place. 
Yet, the preoccupation with forbidden 
themes seemed to have evaporated. It was 
clear that throughout the 1980s restrictions 
on film were becoming more lax.9 
This summation of the censorship 
policy timeline is helpful in understanding 
the political context in which films were 
produced in Iran. However, the social 
atmosphere and attitude towards the 
industry was important both before and 
after the revolution. An iconic image of 
the revolution is the burning of cinemas 
by revolutionaries. Ostensibly the cinemas 
were set ablaze because they represented 
Western infiltration into Iranian society. 
Mohammad-Ali Najafi posited that the 
1979 demonstrations attacked cinemas as a 
symbol rather than as a national institution. 
The symbol which cinemas represented led 
many observers to fear an end to the cinema 
after reforms gave the country greater 
religious and moral overtones.10 
The industry’s redemption may, in 
fact, be attributable to a single mention 
Vetting. By 1984, the regime’s policies had 
shifted again and rather than relying on 
the initiative and persistence of filmmakers 
to produce films, they began a campaign 
to cultivate domestic and local production 
while making importation of films less 
desirable.5 The regime had come to the 
understanding that if film production 
was organic, and devoid of Western or 
monarchical influence, then over time 
it would come to meet the necessary 
standards because it was a purer product 
of Iranian society. It was theorized that 
because of a partial ban since the 1980s on 
Western movies the new films would not be 
corrupted by the West’s immoral tastes.6
One former Minister of State for 
Cinematic Affairs, Fakhrodin Anvar, spoke 
directly of the methods authorities used 
Therefore, it was appealing 
for filmmakers to produce 
films that had international 
appeal as much as it did 
domestic. Filmmakers 
soon came to realize that 
Western audiences enjoyed 
the style that had become 
characteristically Iranian. 
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of a particular film in one of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s famous speeches directly after 
the revolution’s success. Acknowledging 
the destruction of cinemas throughout Iran 
during the revolutionary process, he argued 
that not all films were necessarily bad or 
immoral. Specifically, Khomeini identified 
The Cow (1969) as the model of a good 
film. The Cow had been banned during the 
time of the Shah because it depicted the 
anguish of poverty as well as fear forced 
modernization. Yet, in the new government, 
this model film contained key characteristics 
to its success: it was a divergence from 
commercial films and it represented women 
in a morally ideal way. 11
Level and goals of censorship highlight 
what the regime felt was important or 
the direction in which it wished to shape 
cultural identity. Yet, the main driver of 
cultural identity is the people of Iran. By 
analyzing the films that were actually 
produced during this period, one is able 
to see the effect these constraints had, for 
better or worse. Despite Khomeini’s mention 
of The Cow, directly after the burning of 
the cinemas, the future of the Iranian film 
industry in the early 1980s was not ensured. 
In addition to mired public opinion on the 
morality of the film industry, the outbreak of 
the Iran-Iraq War posed a major threat to the 
industry’s redevelopment.
While in ordinary circumstances an 
industry like film could lose favor in 
government programs during wartime, 
the new Iranian government realized how 
crucial this industry could be in mobilizing 
the Iranian people. Yet, uncertainty about 
the industry’s future left the private-sector 
in limbo, too nervous about the future to 
invest large amounts of money, and the 
industry was essentially paused. In order 
to revive this industry and ultimately have 
the capacity to create the narrative they 
hoped could help win the war, public-sector 
funding was necessary for revival. Because 
of the high percentage of films financed by 
the public-sector, an official national cinema 
was created.  These films “emphasized 
action and violence over sensitivity 
and psychological depth.”12 Films that 
focused primarily on fighting and military 
operations, such as Amir Naderi’s Second 
Search (1981), were never distributed in 
Iran because they went against the regime’s 
agenda.13  Other films, such as J. Shoorjeh’s 
later piece, The Epic of Majnoun, celebrated 
the courage of heroes who fought for Islam. 
In these films, when the hero died for 
his cause, viewers actually felt envy 
towards them.14 
As time passed the message and style 
of films began to change. By the late 
1980s, films made in Iran were being 
selected for international film festivals. 
The first selection was for the film Frosty 
Roads (1987). The film’s selection into the 
Berlin Film Festival gave other Iranian 
filmmakers confidence that their work may 
be appreciated outside of Iran as well. One 
byproduct of international recognition in 
cinema is that international actors begin to 
invest in film production. Therefore, it was 
appealing for filmmakers to produce films 
that had international appeal as much as it 
did domestic. 
Filmmakers soon came to realize that 
Western audiences enjoyed the style that 
had become characteristically Iranian. 
This style could be defined as low-budget 
films with simple plots and on-location 
filming. These individuals sometimes cater 
to the international market, which is much 
more lucrative than the domestic market. 
In recent years, Iran has not had enough 
theaters to even turn the same level of profit 
as is possible abroad. It was around this time 
that the style of ‘Iranian neo-realism’ began 
As the styles of film 
have shifted in the 
continuous process of 
cinematic interpretation of 
Iranian cultural identity, 
the government has altered 
its stance on the
 utility of cinema.
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to take shape. Films focused on minimalist 
plots that illustrated struggles of everyday 
life to create a connection with oftentimes 
more privileged international audiences. 
They were low-budget but set in exotic 
landscapes and ideologically stimulating, 
which contrasted sharply with the high-tech, 
special effect world of Hollywood cinema.15 
This ‘Iranian neo-realism’ movement that 
characterized these films was spearheaded 
by the use of an experimental, semi-
documentary style of filming. In accordance 
with this style, realistic treatment of 
characters and their social environment 
was an avenue through which filmmakers 
examined themselves and presented their 
society to the rest of the world. Famous 
Iranian director Mohsen Makhmalbaf stated 
that documentary-style cinema “allowed us 
to show how we were, not how we were to 
be seen.”16 This shift in film style is, again, 
reflective of the social context through 
which this interpretation of Iranian cultural 
identity was developed. 
Looking back on the evolution of film 
style in Iran, Makhmalbaf said that he saw 
this movement towards documentaries 
as an unconscious response on the part 
of the Iranian people. The media, he 
argued, had “reduced the Iranian people 
to a people capable of prayer alone.”17 The 
injurious discourse of generalizations and 
misperceptions of Iranians in the West is a 
central theme in Fatemeh Keshavarz’s book 
Jasmine and Stars: Reading More than Lolita 
in Tehran. In her critique of Anzar Nafisi’s 
novel, Reading Lolita in Tehran, Keshavarz 
directly addresses the inaccurate perception 
of Iranian cinema by those who contribute 
to the New Orientalist narrative. Nafisi uses 
the example of cinema in Iran as an art 
form that fails to show love, at least in the 
same way Jane Austen illustrates love in her 
works. Keshavarz is quick to point out that 
Iranian film has received large international 
acclaim and that the subject of love is very 
much expressed in films. She points to two 
of Rakhshan Bani-E’temad’s love stories, 
Nargess and Under the Skin of the City, both 
of which were well-received amongst the 
Iranian public and international audiences. 
Keshavarz’s critique of the New 
Orientalist narrative is that it is merely 
a continuation of the same Orientalist 
discourse, only this time with a native face. 
This native face, she says, is deceiving 
in that it is affixed to an imagined sense 
of legitimacy and truth which, as with 
Nafisi’s critique of Iranian cinema, is just a 
misperception. Many, such as Makhmalnaf, 
have argued that cinema has had the most 
success in softening the face of the country 
of Iran, its people, and its culture to 
those abroad.
One of the first Iranian films to 
garner international critical acclaim was 
Amir Naderi’s The Runner (1985). In the 
documentary Iran: a Cinematic Revolution, 
the narrator asks whether this film is famous 
worldwide because of its plot, or because 
it is “Poetry contrast with the country’s 
fanatical image?”18 As the styles of film 
have shifted in the continuous process of 
cinematic interpretation of Iranian cultural 
identity, the government has altered its 
stance on the utility of cinema. Noting the 
success of cinema in softening diplomatic 
tension, or at least public perception, the 
regime has come to appreciate the impact 
of film. In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Iranian cinema’s rise to 
international notoriety 
is, perhaps, one indicator 
that a brighter future is 
possible between Iran and 
the West where narratives 
of Orientalists and New 
Orientalists have given way 
to greater appreciation of 
Persian poetry and culture.
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Ali Akbar Velayati appreciated the impact 
of film so much that he played a key role 
in negotiating Shohei Imamura’s 1997 
acceptance into the Cannes Film Festival.19 
The evolution of Iran’s film industry 
was constrained by the political and social 
context but propelled by the genius of 
Iranian film makers on the path to self-
discovery. The cinema provided a venue for 
the people of Iran to construct their own 
cultural identity. Throughout the history 
of Iranian cinema, censorship has been a 
constant. However, it was not necessarily a 
total impediment. Retrospectively, analysis 
of political context via censorship intentions 
and methods reveal a good deal about the 
ideological frameworks of ruling regimes. 
Yet, it was the social context in Iran during 
each specific period that allowed cinema 
to shape an interpretation of cultural 
identity. Iranian cinema’s rise to 
international notoriety is, perhaps, one 
indicator that a brighter future is possible 
between Iran and the West where narratives 
of Orientalists and New Orientalists have 
given way to greater appreciation of Persian 
poetry and culture. 
